2. What we are looking for is a `ness'. Just as we were able, very largely, to take the metaphysical mysteriousness out of Space and, to some extent, out of Time by recognising our concepts as spatialness (abstracted from particular spaces) and temporalness (abstracted from particular sequences of durations of events), we may well be able to grapple more comfortably with causality, if we can think of it as an ordinary universal with quite familiar, non-mysterious instances. We have drawn a blank in seeking to identify particular relationships within the externa l reality we perceive as such instances. So perhaps we should look, not at the perceived, but at the perceptual process, approach Causality, as we did Identity, as a function of our thinking about the world rather than as a characteristic of certain parts of the world thought about.

a. You must have noticed how often we use the words `the cause' - and always when we are explaining why some situation is as it is. Now, to explain is necessarily to invoke assumptions of causality; `A happens because B happens' implies `If B then A'.

It could well be, then, that the simple, straightforward concept we are seeking is because-ness - and that the instances of it, the ordinary, observable states of affairs in the world from which we abstract that concept, are explanations. We do all explain things (causally) to each other, and to ourselves, all the time. Any `Why?' question is a demand for an explanation.

b. So let's consider just what an explanation is -

i) It is the explanation of some state of affair to somebody. `Explanation', like `sensation', is a potentially misleading noun. There are no explanations floating around in the world ready to be used. What we are talking of is the explaining of something by somebody.

ii) An explanation is called for only when somebody is puzzled. If Jones can't think why his car won't start then Brown might be able to explain this to him. If he already knows that it is because it has no petrol in the tank, then Brown cannot explain this to him, though he might to Mrs Jones who is waiting to go shopping.

iii) An explanation is an achievement (like winning, not like running); we can attempt to explain but fail. What counts as the explanation is the removal of the puzzlement which somebody felt. The car-problem is explained to Jones at the point where he can say `Oh, if I'd known that, I wouldn't have asked'.

We might, therefore, say that explanation is a kind of retrospective prediction: `Had I been aware of what you had just told me, then this present situation is exactly what I could have predicted and so I wouldn't have been puzzled by it at all'

Here two points should be noted -

i) Although we ask `Why?', the answer we get does not point to a `Why?' (there is no such thing to point to!); it points to a `what' (or a `how'). `Why?' questions can only have `What was the case' answers; the inferences are made by the explanee.

ii) It therefore follows that what is an explanation of X to Jones may not be an explanation of X to Brown. Its being so, its success in removing puzzlement, depends upon their inferences.

Suppose that Jones and Brown ask you `Why is there a wet patch on the carpet?' and you reply `The neighbours are away again'. Jones says `Oh, I see' but Brown still looks puzzled. It could be that Jones knows, and Brown does not, that when your neighbours go away you look after their notoriously incontinent dog - or it could be that they both know this but Jones is simply better at making inferences, is being, on this occasion more intelligent than Brown (as we defined intelligence in Topic 10 - 3. e. v).

It is clear, then, that the criteria for an explanation are psychological, subjective - that each individual has received an explanation (what is for him the explanation of this state of affairs) when he has asked `Why?' often enough and had answers which `filled out the total picture' to the point where he could see this as a customary complex which does include the situation he had previously found puzzling. So explaining X to Jones is just `filling in the missing bits' of Jones's awareness of the world so that he gets the `whole picture' or a whole enough picture to remove his puzzlement.

But

i) the bits that are missing for Jones may be quite different bits from those that are missing for Brown - so they need different explanations - and

ii) there never could be the whole picture since, as we have seen, there are no starting points of `causal chains' - and explanations are always causal explanations; if we were not assuming causality (i.e. illicitly importing necessity) it could not be an explanation for us.

Thus, though explanation as such is necessarily subjective, we, the explanees, must be assuming an objective (nature of reality) basis for it. And, since explanation is retrospective prediction, and predictions do generally work (otherwise we would live, if at all, in constant confusion) - we must, in some way, be right. Identifying in just what way is our major task here.

c. But, before confronting that task, we need to be clear about all explanation being the explanation of some situation (puzzling) to somebody. The something explained must be a particular state of affairs and the explanation must be in terms of other particular states of affairs - which, together with the puzzling situation to be explained, form (for the explanee) a customary complex of experience. Now since -

i) complexes are made up of complexes and make up complexes -

ii) all beliefs (predictions, explanations) are at some level of precision/vagueness - and

iii) to identify is necessarily to identity (an instance of) a class -

this applies whether the explanation seems to be of a particular event or what people think of as a general rule.

Here compare -

i) Why did Tabby catch that mouse? - Because it foolishly emerged from its hole just as she was passing.

ii) Why do cats catch mice? - a. Because that is the nature of cats - b. Because a cat is a carnivorous animal and basically a nocturnal hunter and mice are vulnerable, mainly nocturnal, creatures which provide a suitable diet for cats - etc.

When we look at ii) we see that the a. answer is not an explanation at all; it is merely an assertion that cats do catch mice - and, as such, something that must be assumed for the answer in i) to be an explanation at all. If it were not known to be in the nature of cats to catch mice, then the fact that the mouse emerged when the cat was passing would not explain why that cat caught that mouse; a rabbit passing the mouse-hole at the time would not have caught the mouse. Some general rules must be assumed in any explanation.

When we turn to the b. answer we see that, in this case, the rule itself is being explained (as a constantly repeated phenomenon) in terms of more basic rules such as carnivorous animals being hunters, certain foodstuffs being suitable for certain species - etc. - all of which can, in turn be explained (to people who are puzzled by them) in terms of other so-called rules.

This is a difficult point and probably needs to be pondered a while. But when we realise that explaining is a function of our thought - and that all thought is in universals about particulars (particular instances of universals) - we see that all we are ever doing in explaining is adding to somebody's awareness sufficient information to enable him to identify the universal concept (at the appropriate level of precision) of which this customary complex (which includes the event to be explained) is an instance.

d. It should also have been noted that, by the analysis we have given of explanation, we cannot speak intelligibly of an explanation being right or wrong; it can only be effective - either it does remove (somebody's) puzzlement, in which case it is an explanation, or it doesn't, in which case it isn't. To say that it should or shouldn't is simply to make our own judgement of the current range of appropriate awareness and the level of intelligence of the (intended) explanee.

And this is precisely why it is possible for something to be the explanation (of something to somebody) when it is not possible for any event to be the cause (of any other event) - notwithstanding that we all tend to refer to whatever is for us the explanation of an event as the cause of that event.

It is because of this that the essentially subjective nature of explanation creates, if not problems, certainly discomforts -

i) On Christmas morning a child may well be puzzled (however delighted) by the stocking full of good things hanging on its cot. The child is told that Santa Claus brought it, and is puzzled no more. The story about Santa Claus, therefore, meets all the requirement; it is the explanation (of the stocking to the child). The fact that it is a pack of lies makes no difference. Of course, before long the child will figure out that old men can't climb down chimneys and that one old man can't visit all the children in the world in the same night and so on - and will be puzzled again, so that explanation is no longer working; it has ceased to be an explanation (of this to him). This is just another instance of our constant re-conditioning by experience.

But it points up the fact that, in accepting anything as the explanation of any state of affairs, we do assume that it will remain for us the explanation. When it does not, our natural inclination is to say (however wrongly) that we now see that it wasn't the explanation at all. What we mean is that it wasn't really the cause- but no particular event is the cause. What we should say is that the story in question serves no longer as an explanation for us.

ii) Even when the explanation given is indeed a true account of past events, we find it very difficult to avoid distinguishing between `right explanations' and `wrong' ones. A shrub in the garden has died rather suddenly and we attribute this to the drought we have been having. But when we dig it up we find that the roots are all destroyed by insect pests. We cannot but feel that we had explained the shrub's demise wrongly, that the real explanation was insect damage. This kind of ambivalence is inevitable because, although explanation is a psychological phenomenon, it can be explanation only by virtue of our assumption (in accepting it) that we are appraised of a causal relationship which exists out there in the real world.

But now we seem almost to be back where we started, since what we think of as a causal realtionship (as we have seen in 1. f. above) would have to be some kind of logical relationship (implication) between particular states of affairs - and there can be no such relationship. So let's rephrase it slightly, not as `a causal relationship which exists out there' but as `that causality which exists in the nature of external reality'. In making this move we are avoiding the absurdity of individual causes causing and we are not attempting to specify what that causality is;we are merely postulating causality as that which enables us to explain and predict with comparative success in much the same way as we postulated objective reality as that which makes certain instances of believing be also instances of knowing.

e. This seems more hopeful since, just as any belief could be wrong but most are not, so any explanation could have to be abandoned but most do not. What we are claiming is an insight, not into inconceivable, quasi-logical relationships, but into the nature of the total external reality within which we exist, through an actual experience of some (assumed to be totally representative) part of it.

We can allow that `the total explanation' in some kind of objective way (and thereby what could be regarded as `the cause') can only be the entire history to date of the universe but, at the same time, assume that when we have slotted in, with what we already know, the extra piece of information which is (for us on any occasion) the explanation of a particular puzzling situation, we have a customary complex which is effectively enough representative of total objective reality for us to be right (i.e. have accepted an explanation which we will not find ourselves abandoning) nearly all the time. And, further, that when we do find ourselves no longer accepting an explanation (and here think of both the Santa Claus and the drought/insects examples) we do so because we are operating within a wider, and therefore more representative, view of the nature of objective reality.

But, of course, no individual's experience, the experience by which that individual is conditioned, ever could fully represent the nature of reality as a whole. Here try to think of a very elaborate lace-edged table-cloth. In spite of the intricacy of the pattern, there is a symmetry about it such that, when we have examined the parts of the lace edge in detail and stood back and viewed the whole table-cloth, we could predict, from the pattern of loops and curls and such manifested in the totality, exactly what the sequence of loops and curls and such must be in any part of the lace edge. But a very small insect crawling round the lace edge does not have the benefit of the overview of the table-cloth; just as it has got used to a certain regularity of sequence of loops of a given size and shape, there is suddenly, and unexpectedly, a curl of a different kind. As it progresses, it finds that such curls occur every ten loops - and its expectances widen accordingly (if it had covered ten loops and there was no curl it would be surprised). This widening of expectancies process can go on for any length of time (again - conditioning and re-conditioning) but it will always be possible for a new surprise to occur simply because our little insect does not have the benefit of the overview of the cloth; it could never stand back and look at the totality as a totality. And, of course, nothing could stand back and look at the universe as a totality. So, in our noting of regularities of sequence we are all in the same condition as this unfortunate insect; no matter how often something has happened that way, there always could be circumstances, unbeknown to us, this time which will make it happen differently.

What this amounts to, of course, is that the explanation in some quite objective sense (that which would have to be an adequate explanation for anybody) would be the cause - but only because it embraces every aspect of reality which could be the `missing bit'- i.e. the totality of circumstances preceding the circumstance to be explained. Put very simply, the cause of any event is every other event. This event is as it is because the universe is as it is.

Thus, when irritated parents are tired of explaining why this and why that, and snap back `Oh - because it is!', they are, in fact, quite correct; ultimately this is the only answer. Unfortunately, however, it is totally unhelpful; by taking becauseness to its logical conclusion it quite destroys its purpose. Here think again of the lace table-cloth example: so long as we can and do stand back and view the lace edge in its entirety, so that we could predict the exact sequence of any part of it, we have no need so to predict since we already know; there is, for us, nothing to be explained.

f. It should now be apparent that what we are doing whenever we `illicitly assume necessity' in our (causal) thinking about the world (which is of course all of the time) is taking those facts with which w e are familiar as representative of the totality of fact. To the extent that we are justified in doing so, we are justified in assuming necessity, since the totality - being the totality - must be precisely as it is. We might say that fact is the `meeting point' of possibility and necessity. Here refer back to 1. c) - the only actuality which is a necessity is that everything is as everything is. An actuality is a possibility which happens to be so, but it is a necessity that every actuality is whatever it is. Whereas -

i) any event could have been otherwise - i.e. it is always possible to conceive of X being so or X being not so nevertheless -

ii) every event must be the event that it is - i.e. it is not possible to conceive of X being so and X being not so.

If X is part of the universe, then it must be the part of the universe that it is - and what it is is determined by its relationships with every other part of the universe. Thus, to know the nature of the universe is to know, in respect of each fact within it, what that fact must be.

It should now be clear that our concepts of becauseness, of what we refer to as causality, are abstracted from observed instances of explanation - but only because (!) explanations assume the necessity which would pertain if our awareness of aspects of reality were indeed an awareness of the totality of reality. It may, of course, be felt to be paradoxical that, if this were so, we would never be puzzled and would, therefore, have no need for explanation.



3. We have established that -

i) all of our thinking about the world is in causal terms - and

ii) such thinking must assume that, notwithstanding the limitations of our own knowledge and the consequently inevitable risk that we mis-predict, everything that occurs must be the way it is because everything else is the way it is.

As we are about to examine, albeit briefly, some central questions of ethics - the philosophy, we might say, of human values as distinct from of human reasoning - we should consider some significant implications of the analysis we have made of causality.

a. Firstly, let it be quite clear that if we did not accept that everything must be the way it is because everything else is the way it is, then we could have no grounds for predicting at all; we do not `think causally' from choice or by accident; thinking about external reality is making causal inferences. We use the term `random' to describe those events which are not planned and occur in patterns which are not in fact predictable by us. But this does not imply that they are not, in principle, explainable, simply that they are not in fact explained. If there were such a thing as intrinsic randomness, events which were totally unrelated causally to all other events notwithstanding that they are related spatially and temporally (if this be intelligible at all), then we could never know which events were caused and which events were random and would, thereby, be inhibited from achieving certainness (a pre-requisite for knowing) about anything at all. To suggest that there might be some way of distinguishing random events from caused events would be to imply that something identifiable caused them to be random!. We are entering fairyland.

b. Let us, then, discount randomness altogether and allow that the differences are not between events which are explainable and those which are not, but simply between those events which we can in fact explain to our satisfaction (which do not go on puzzling us) and those which we in fact cannot (which do go on puzzling us). We frequently put things in the too-hard basket but we do not, thereby, deny that there is an explanation if only we could find it - (if only we could see a better overall view of that `lace-edge').

So, although we now see that we should not claim that every event has a cause (which is at least misleading), we all do allow that every event is caused - i.e. must be as it is because history is as it is.

It is worth noting here that it has been suggested (indeed, in one of the most famous philosophical works of all time) that the realisation that every event is caused is somehow an intuitive awareness of a state of affairs, but by the analysis given here of causality, no such oddity is implied; indeed `every event is caused' is simply a tautology. Think about it -

i) An event is always an arbitrary isolation by somebody of one duration of change (to a particular object) from the `stream of' (durations of) change. To be an event, therefore, X must be preceded by and succeeded by other events.

ii) Every event is, in principle, explainable in terms of prior events. And explanation is `retrospective prediction' - since that was the case, this must be the case.

iii) What we call `being caused' just is being explainable.

iv) Thus an uncaused event would have to be an event isolated in time - totally outside the `stream of events (changes)' which is the universe - and this is very plainly unthinkable.

The concept of becauseness simply is the concept of predictability. Sensing and reasoning are inherent capacities; granted these we need no intuitive knowledge of the world. As we have seen, making causal assumptions is simply the way we reason about how we sense.

c. But, quite obviously, if everything that is happening (every present event) is explainable in terms of (i.e. caused by) everything that has happened (all the past events), then everything that will happen (the future events) will be explainable in the same way in terms of what are now past, present and future events. And to assert that X is explainable to us is to assert that X must be exactly as it is because circumstances we are (or in principle could become) aware of make it so. We cannot have a `present' which is wholly determined by `the past' and a `future' which is not. Indeed if this were so, prediction would be (and always would have been) impossible.

Thus, to accept causality at all - which plainly we do and must - is to accept total determination - to accept that everything that will be is `already fixed' by everything that is and has been. So the idea of a closed and settled past but an open and yet-to-be-determined future is very silly; future events are no more open than past ones. Certainly they seem so to us, simply because we know, or can generally find out, what is happening and what has happened but we can generally only speculate about what will happen. There is a significant difference between being predictable in principle and actually being predicted by somebody. But it is not a difference which is relevant to the nature of the universe we make our predictions about (except to the extent that we, the predictors, are part of that universe). It should now be quite plain, if it was not before, why, when we say that fact is whatever is the case, the `is' embraces both `was' and `will be'.

With this clear we should be much better placed to consider the concept of choice-making and what people call `free-will', our next topic, without any strange, and ultimately unintelligible, notions of our continually re-directing the course of history.