2. Look first at fact.

a) People often use the expression: `As a matter of fact...'. Generally they mean something like `You may not be aware of this but it is so'. Yet, even if it were not so, it would still be a matter of fact - since it is the kind of thing that could be so. So - a matter of fact is a possibility, a `matter' of whether or not a possible state of affairs happens to be an actual state of affairs. Thus, when we use the term, what we are distinguishing the matter of fact from can only be a `matter of necessity' (a matter of logic).

Remember - for all thinking we must have `data' to think about and a `reasoning capacity' in order to think about it. Issues of data (is it or is it not so?) are matters of fact and issues of reasoning (is this or is this not implied?) are matters of necessity. So - if a matter of fact is a possibility, a fact is a possibility which is so (an actuality).

Here think again of the example: Jones is a husband, so Jones has a wife. Whether or not Jones is a husband is a matter of fact; if he is, then whether or not has a wife is a matter of necessity (of logic). Enquiry into a matter of fact involves observation of the data (the world about us); enquiry into a matter of necessity involves analysis of the concepts.

b) It should be plain that fact cannot be dependent upon thought; what people believe is quite irrelevant to what is the case. [Except to the extent that whether or not Jones does believe something is, itself, part of `what is the case'] If it is the case that a certain rock was in a certain position 1,000,000 years before there was any life on this planet, then it is the case (is fact). That nobody was there to be aware of it is of no consequence. So, although we can, and must, `order our thoughts', this does not `order' fact - merely our awareness of it. We can think about the world only in `discrete bits' - isolated aspects - but we do the isolating; what is so is simply all that is so, there are no neat, readymade subdivisions in it. Thus what Jones thinks of as a fact (or one fact) is simply that aspect of fact which Jones has isolated in his thinking process. Let us say, therefore: Our thought cannot create fact, but our thought is all that can create the subdivisions into what we think of as `separate facts'.

Here it is worth noting a point which will become very important later. Since everything that is so is inter-related with everything else which is so - i.e. fact is the totality of what is so - then, if any separate fact were different from what it is, then the totality would be a different totality. And every part of it would, thereby, be different because that part is what it is by virtue of its relationship with the whole i.e. its relationships with every other part (singly or collectively). There is, therefore, a very important sense in which, if anything were different, everything would be different.

c) What, then, can we say (or think) intelligibly about Fact?

i) Plainly not that it is true or false. `False fact' is an obvious absurdity (though there can be `false belief' that X is a fact). `True fact' might seem like a tautology - but anybody who so thinks is misunderstanding badly; if it makes no sense to say that X is false, then equally it makes no sense to say that X is true. Since fact is what renders propositions true or false, it cannot itself be true or false; it just is - so.

ii) Nor can we speak intelligibly of past, present or future facts. Fact, as such, is timeless in that it `embraces' what we think of as temporal sequence. When we say ` that is the case' the `is' includes `was' and `will be'.

This is often a difficult point for people to come to terms with and their failure to do so results in such nonsenses as saying that we can know that past states of affair are so but not that future states of affairs will be so. The problem arises mainly from a confusion between fact(s) and events. That an event occurred (occurs, will occur) at a given time - i.e. contemporaneously with certain other events - is `part of fact'. But the fact is not at that time. It is a fact that it rained in Newcastle yesterday and (so I believe) it is a fact that it will rain in Newcastle again before the year is out.

Thus, if X is (a) fact, then X always was and always will be (a) fact. Nothing can become fact or cease to be fact - though it is fact that things constantly change - i.e. that events occur.

iii) We cannot speak of fact (or even a fact) as being comparatively vague or precise. Fact is the totality of what is so and, as such, we might say, is `ultimately precise' (if that were not a patently silly expression). What is comparatively vague or precise is our thought about fact or our awareness of it; the fact is simply as it is.

iv) Fact cannot be stated. When people say `I'm stating a fact' they are making an obvious category error (even though they are generally understood); what they are stating is a proposition which they claim to be true (i.e. in accordance with fact). So we can refer to fact, believe that a fact is a fact, be aware of a fact. Indeed a fact is what we are aware of when we know something.

v) To talk of fact, however, is to assert the existence of an objective reality independent of and prior to any awareness. It is safest, therefore, to content ourselves with the simple description - Fact is whatever is so (bearing in mind that the `is' embraces `was' and `will be').



3. We think about fact in propositions. In order to think (be aware, `make contact' with the objective reality), we must isolate certain aspects, certain relationships of elements, within the totality of inter-related elements which is fact - i.e. we must create for ourselves `think-about-able' facts - i.e. we must formulate propositions (which are all of the `this X is a Y' kind. We could put it that the proposition is the `thinkable form' of an aspect of fact.

Here it must be understood that we do not `select' the propositional form as the best way of thinking about the world (from some set of options). There are no options; we simply find that thinking has to be propositional. Thinking must be somebody thinking something about something (i.e. that this X is a Y). Just try thinking about something without thinking anything about it!

We might say that the proposition is the `thought-structure' which renders fact think-about-able.

a) If X is true (or false) then X is a proposition. To have the concept of proposition is to realise that propositions, and only propositions, are true or false (and every proposition is either true or false). It is true if it reflects (corresponds with) what is the case (fact); it is false if it does not. It follows, therefore, that every fact (every isolatable aspect of what is the case, every relationship within the totality of what is so,) gives rise to one true proposition - and to limitless false propositions.

And the proposition is the isolation of the `specific fact' in question.

It is the fact that this pen is blue which renders the propositions, This pen is red, This pen is green (etc) false. From which it will be seen that the fact isolated by the proposition, This pen is green, notwithstanding that it is a false proposition, is the fact that this pen is blue. Thus, in our thinking, our formulation of propositions, we are ` imposing an order on the world' even when we are making mistakes.

b) Now - a rather difficult point which needs careful consideration. Fact is independent of (prior to) thought - simply what is so. Thus every relationship within what is so is (potentially) a fact (an isolatable by proposition). It therefore follows that for every fact (whether anybody is aware of it or not) there is a true proposition - what we might call the `thinkable form of that state of affairs'. It is, therefore, a misunderstanding of the concept of proposition to regard a proposition as the thought about a fact; rather we must regard it as the think-about-ability of a fact. We might put it that, when somebody `entertains a proposition`, he is able to do so only because of the existence of a fact (an isolatable aspect of fact) in much the same way as when somebody entertains guests he is able to do so only because there are people available to be entertained.

`There is a thought' implies `There is a thinker', just as `There is a belief' implies `There is a believer',` There is a hope' implies `There is a hoper' - etc. But what we are saying here is that `There is a proposition' does not imply `There is a proposer', that there is an important sense in which there are propositions which nobody has ever, as yet, entertained simply because there are people who could entertain them.

The discomfort people might feel about this is because it seems to be creating `queer entities', propositions somehow waiting around to be proposed. But that is not what is being suggested. The proposition is simply the thinkable form of the state of affairs. When we think we think in propositions - but the thinking `consists of' beliefs (doubts, hopes, fears and so on) and the propositions we think in are simply the structured content of these beliefs.

[Here it might be helpful to think of patterns. A pattern can manifest only when something (a piece of cloth or whatever) has that pattern. But we do not want to say that the cloth is the pattern. Nor, when we think what kind of thing a pattern is, do we want to say that the pattern comes into existence only when it is produced on that piece of cloth].

c) So, the proposition is a `thought structure' - and we must consider what that structure is. Here we must grapple with the quite difficult concepts of universals and particulars.

i) We should say `particularness' and `universalness' because (and here it is highly relevant) all concepts are nesses. And when we say `a universal' we mean `a ness'.Thus concepts are all universal concepts.

Since

a. we `think in' nesses (in universals) and

b. we think propositionally

It follows that the `elements' of the proposition must be universals(nesses).

[Here compare communicating in language by symbols - from which it follows that the `elements' of a language must be symbols].

ii) But, to think is to think something (general) about something (specific) - e.g. that this pen is blue. Now, It is quite easy to see this as `This pen has (the universal property) blueness' - or rather better, `This pen is an instance of blueness'. But we are talking about this pen; we are not saying `This pen-ness is an instance of blueness' (that would, quite simply, be nonsense).

What we are saying is `This instance of pen-ness (i.e. this pen) is (also) an instance of blueness (i.e. is blue)' - and that is perfectly intelligible.

iii) It is the concept of instance (instance-ness, instantiation) which is the key to the whole understanding of the universal/particular relationship. To have that concept is to realise that an instance can only be a particular instance - and that what it must be a partcular instance of can only be a universal.

Thus the proposition is the attribution of an additional (general) universal property (e.g. blueness) to a particular instance of a universal property (e.g. pen-ness). It should be clear, then, that the universe is not `composed of' universals and particulars which somehow `attach to each other' (as some strange accounts of universals seem to suggest). There is no universal/particular distinction in `objective reality' - we universalise (classify) and we particularise (focus upon a given instance) and note additional things about it; the distinction/relationship belongs in the realm of thought.

Indeed, we gain our concepts by abstraction (of the common elements) from different perceived situations [think again of the customary complexes which are the bases of our believing] and, having gained those concepts, we see as the instances of them those situations from which the concepts were abstracted. We abstract the concept pen-ness from our observation of those articles we subsequently think of as pens (i.e. particular instances of pen-ness); we abstract the concept blueness from our observations of what we subsequently think of as blue objects (particular instances of blueness); we are then competent to accept the proposition (to believe) that this pen is blue.

iv) Now, since a particular (the bit the proposition is about) can only be a particular instance of a universal property, we can say `this pen' but we can't (intelligibly) say just `this'; there are no `bare this's'. Here refer back to the use of ` also' in ii above - This instance of pen-ness is also an instance of blueness. What is implied here is that being blue is no part of what counts as being a pen (if it were, it would be merely tautological). So, on saying `this pen' are we already incorporating into the `this' everything (all the characteristics) which (for us) count as being a pen and observing that this pen (this set of those characteristics) also happens to be blue (an instance of blueness).

[Here think very hard about the relevance of the possibility/necessity relationship - Since it is a pen, the `pen-ness characteristics' are there of necessity but its being, or not being, blue is obviously a possibility].

v) Note also the point made at length that complexes are `composed of' complexes. What any universal term (any `ness') `names' is a complex. So we can say that universals are `composed of' universals.

Thus the `particular' in any proposition (the thing the assertion is made about) can be `broken down' into `propositional form'. Consider:

a. This tabby is hungry.

b. This cat is a tabby.

c. This animal is a cat.

d. This object is an animal - etc.

It is important to understand this because it is the `solution' to what might seem to be an awkward problem - since a. to think is to think propositionally; there is no thought `less than' a proposition.

b. a proposition must have two elements - the particular (the thought about) and the universal (what is thought about it)

How, then, can we be aware of the particular (as such) in order to observe something about it?

Here it is crucial to bear in mind that a proposition is a function of thought - not of language. It is then realised that in formulating the proposition `This tabby is hungry' we are already employing the proposition `This cat is a tabby' (and so on down the line) in the identification of an instance of a universal kind.

It must be understood that, whether we are thinking about this tabby, this cat, this animal or whatever, it is always this instance of that (universal) kind - and the universal in question must have some degree of complexity - i.e. be itself expressable as one instance of a kind.

vi) At this point it could be useful to look at connotation and denotation. This could be considered `out of context' because the connotation and denotation are of terms (within languages) and, therefore, in the `communication bag', not the `thought bag'. There is, however, an important inter-relation between connotation/denotation and universal/particular, one which should cast some light on the points dealt with above.

The connotation of a term is, in effect, the analysis of the concept signified by that term - so it is really (at a language level) what counts as one of these. [Indeed, the connotation is what a dictionary should give you when you `look up a word to see what it means']. The denotation is the totality of particular instances in the universe of that connotation. So, the connotation defines the class signified by the term; the denotation indicates the total of individual members (there happens to be) of that class. So, if we take the connotation, Australian Cabinet Minister in 1987, the denotation will be Bob Hawk, Bill Hayden, Paul Keating, etc., etc.

It should be obvious that there is a- kind of inverse relationship: the more extended the connotation, the less extensive the denotation. The denotation of `ship' is all the things in the world that count as ships; when we `extend the connotation' to `steamship' we, thereby, narrow down to a sub-division of all the ships - we cut out the sailing and motor ships.

So - the connotation is always a catalogue of universals (and, as such, deals in necessities, in what `counts as'); the denotation is always an aggregate of particular instances (and, as such, deals in possibilities, in what happens to be the case).

Thus, in identifying something as a tabby (to say `This tabby is hungry') we are assuming the connotation of `tabby' - i.e. domestic cat/grey colours/stripes of a particular kind. Now consider, in the light of this, the point that (at the propositional level) in `This tabby is hungry' the particular (this tabby) already `invokes' the (less precise) proposition this animal is grey, striped, etc.

vii) To return to universals and particulars - the `order' of the proposition indicates simply the focal point of the thinker - which element he is thinking about and which element is what he is thinking about it. There are no such orders in `objective reality' - simply two elements related In a particular way. Imagine that Jones is lying in the sun and rolls up the paper he was reading into a tube and puts it to his eye like a telescope (as most of us have done at some time). He sees a little circle of blue sky and he says to himself `This sky is blue'. The sky is what he is talking about (the particular of his proposition) and the blueness is what he is attributing to it (this instance of skyness is also an instance of blueness). But, suppose Jones were a colour-consultant, might he not just as easily - and just as rightly - say `This blue is sky - This instance of blueness (unlike others I have encountered) is also an instance of skyness'? This illustrates very simply the point that we do the ordering. In objective reality the interrelationship of the two `instances' just is there; which (for him) is ` the thing' and which the `quality of it' arises from his formulation of the proposition.

d) So what is the logical category of propositions? What can we intelligibly say about them?

i) They are always the attribution of a universal property to a particular instance of a different universal property - so we can ask what particular state of affairs they are about (what fact they refer to) and what they assert about it.

ii) We can ask about any proposition: `Is it true or false?' - it must be one or the other and could be either.

iii) We can think of it as the `content' of a belief - any belief must be propositional. This does not imply, however, that to contemplate a proposition (i.e. a possibility) is necessarily to believe it to be true (i.e. the possibility to be an actuality). -

iv) In communication the `message' is propositional. It `refers' somebody to a state of affairs by causing him to formulate the appropriate proposition (about that state of affairs) - but

v) We cannot ask (intelligibly) `What words does a proposition contain?'. We are not dealing with words but with ideas. The same proposition can be `expressed' in any number of different language forms.

vi) Propositions imply propositions. Implication is (necessarily) a relationship between propositions. The proposition that he has a son implies the proposition that he is a parent. The propositions that Jones believes that X and that X is so jointly imply the proposition that Jones knows that X. However, a tautology is not a proposition; it is merely the uttering of a necessity produced to look like the statement of a proposition. `The son has a parent' could not be false - and, therefore could not be true; it is merely necessary. We cannot, therefore, ask intelligibly whether a proposition asserts a necessity or a possibility - to be a proposition it must assert a possibility to be an actuality.

[There has been in philosophy considerable confusion on this point, so it needs to be considered very carefully].

vii) We cannot ask intelligibly whether a proposition is intelligible. Here think again of the `verifiability criterion of intelligibly'. Any assertion is intelligible to Jones only insofar as Jones knows, in sense-experience terms, what situation would count for him as that assertion being true and what situation(s) would count for him as that assertion being false.

A proposition must `propose' something; if it were not intelligible there would be nothing proposed.

Thus there can be nonsense utterances - but there cannot be nonsense propositions. A nonsense utterance precisely is an utterance which fails to express any proposition, notwithstanding that it is uttered in (grammatically correct) sentences.

viii) A proposition can be stated. Indeed, the `content' of any statement must be a proposition. We must be quite clear, however, that it is not being stated that `makes it' a proposition nor is it how it is stated (if it is) that makes it the proposition that it is.

Here compare `a game can be played' with `a work can be dramatised'. In the first of these, the game just is the playing of it; in the second, the work is what it is (as a novel) and, as such, `sets the rules' for the dramatisation. The stating of propositions is like the dramatisation of novels (not the playing of games) - but with the odd quirk that we tend to think of the dramatised version as the novel which is dramatised. (We tend, however wrongly, to think of the statement as the proposition).



4. It is now appropriate to switch attention to statements - and here we move into the realm of communication.

a) The confusion referred to above arises from our tendency to think of a statement as some kind of entity; it is not an entity - it is an activity (the playing, not the game). For there to be a statement, there must be a stater - somebody stating a proposition. It is better, therefore to think, not of statements, but of statings. People state propositions which assert that states of affairs pertain.

A statement is, therefore, potentially a communication. It is not, however, necessarily a communication, merely the uttering of a proposition in a way which can enable communication to occur when the conditions for this are right. A failed attempt to communicate involves the uttering of statements. And, indeed, what we usually call `thinking in language' involves the formulation of statements (though not the uttering of them). In neither case is communication occurring. Thus, whilst there cannot be communication without statements, there can be statements without communication.

Here it is instructive to compare:

i) `I informed Jones but he did not understand me' - which (by most people's use of `inform') would be contradictory.

ii) `I made a statement but nobody (but me) understood it' - which is perfectly intelligible - and an all-too-familiar situation.

Thus, when we say that a statement (a stating) is the uttering (rendering public) of a proposition (by somebody) - we must realise that we mean only that it is the rendering of the proposition in a publicly accessible form. [A piece of land can be a public park whether the public uses it or not - provided they are entitled to use it and have access to it].

b) What makes a statement the statement that it is is the proposition which is stated, not the manner in which it is stated. The same statement can be made -

i) in any language - note that translation simply is the expression in one language of a statement uttered in another -

ii) in many different ways within a given language (provided the language is complex enough in its `rules') e.g. `The Bolsheviks murdered Nicholas II' utters the same proposition (makes the same statement) as `The man who was Czar of Russia in 1917 was illegally killed by the Bolsheviks'. We are not here concerned with whether the proposition is true [people might well argue about the legality]; we are concerned only with the identity of the statement (in the two forms). So, let us say simply that a statement is a potential message (formulated by an individual) which purports to express a true proposition.

c) There is, then, plainly a sense in which communication is `composed of' statements in a way exactly parallel with that in which thought is `composed of' propositions.

As propositions are manifested in believings (the `thinking process') - so statements are manifested in the use of symbols (the `communicating process').

So - stating (making statements) is the act of communicating (or attempting to communicate).

We might well say that, just as propositions are the `thinkability of' facts, so statements are the `communicability of' propositions.

d) It is here desirable to clear away a possible confusion arising from misunderstanding of the inter-relationship between statements and sentences (between communication and language - the achievement and the mode of that achievement). In the study of language (as such - e.g. `doing grammar') it is usual for distinctions to be made between what are here called statements and other kinds of significant utterences - e.g. questions, orders, ejaculations. `This is a pen' is plainly a different communication from `Is this a pen?' or `Pass me a pen' or `What a lousy pen!'. But they are not different kinds of communication. To communicate is to state a proposition and be understood). And a proposition can only be that X is Y. As we have seen, a language can be any set of rules - so long as they work. And in English (and most other natural languages) rules have developed for the speedy transmission of certain kinds of information - but what is transmitted must be information, and information is propositional. So the information `I do not know whether this is a pen and hope that you can inform me whether it is or not' is conveyed by the symbol `Is this a pen?', the information `I want a pen and demand that you provide me with one' by `Pass me a pen', the information `I am disappointed by the performance of this pen' by `What a lousy pen.' - etc. In philosophy many red-herrings have been drawn across the thought/language relationship by people who have simply not grasped the categorial difference between statements and sentences. Dealing with language as such, it is quite proper, indeed essential, to distinguish different sentential forms. But this does not imply that there exist some intrinsically non-propositional statements or that communication includes some non-statements, or that some propositions vary from the `that X is Y' format.

Always what is stated is that a state of affairs pertains - i.e. that a possibility is an actuality. It follows, then, that any statement is intelligibly contradictable - it publicly proposes that something is the case when it might or might not be the case. With this in mind, consider some possible states of affairs:

i) that the window is closed -

ii) that Jones believes that the window is open but is wrong -

iii) that, if the window is opened, there will be a draught -

iv) that, if Jones is married, then he must have a spouse.

All of these are statable - because all of these are possibilities. i and ii present no problems. iii is more complex, but it is plainly asserting a ` causal relationship' so that it can, quite simply, be contradicted (denied) by anyone who makes a different inference. The problem people may feel is with iv. Here we have what has to date been called a statement of a necessity. But what we are doing is stating that it is a necessity that if Jones is married Jones has a spouse. And it is now time to front up to the difficult point that nothing can be a necessity of necessity.

Remember - concepts are individual people's concepts and reasoning is individual people's reasoning. So, to say that the denial of an assertion is literally unthinkable may or may not be true. If Jones told us that, since he is a parent, he must have a son - then we would all say `Silly Jones - he believes that is necessary when it is not - having a daughter is still being a parent'.

Thus, whereas (we all agree) `A son has a parent' is not a statement at all, merely a tautology, `If anyone is a son then, of necessity, he must have a parent' is in fact a statement that `a son has a parent' is mere tautology which it might not be (we could all be wrong in the way that Jones was in his assertion).

[What we are looking at here is the `problem' that the validity of logic cannot be demonstrated by logic - we cannot invoke a particular law to prove that it is a good law! Logic (the acceptance of necessities) must, therefore, be intuitive and, as such, by its own rules, possibly right and possibly wrong. This in no way affects our `psychological compulsion' to accept it as right - but this does not seem to be different in any relevant way from our psychological compulsion to believe - e.g. that we are awake and observing, not asleep and dreaming. [This, however, should perhaps be noted as an area for further analytical enquiry at a later stage of philosophical development and, for the present, in case people are getting worried about their grasps on reality, they should be reminded that, although we always could be wrong, we very rarely are].

e) To return to more straightforward matters, let us go through the exercise of considering what assertions can, and cannot, be made intelligibly about statements -

i) Plainly, a statement, as such, is not true or false. The proposition stated is what is true or false. A statement (a stating of a proposition to somebody) is an action and, as such, not the `kind of thing' to which trueness or falseness can apply. Even so, so long as people do realise this, it would be pedantic to object to the expression `A false statement'. This is simply a ` language rule' for `the stating of a false proposition'.

ii) The same applies to the expressions `a foolish statement' or `a wise statement'. It is the stater that is wise or foolish - compare `an energetic leap over the puddle'. Note, by contrast, that it does make sense to speak of a long statement or a short statement - here we are talking of the stating not of the stater.

iii) We may also speak of a clear statement or an unclear statement - so long as we are aware in doing so that we are making this judgement from the `receiver end'; we are saying `It is (or is not) clear to me what he is stating at the level of precision which I assume he intends'.

iv) A statement may be comparatively simple or complex. We can say `Jones's statements were too complex for me; I did not understand him'. But they could not be too complex for Jones - or they could not be statements (of propositions). We cannot ask whether a statement is intelligible to the utterer since it is his stating of a proposition (however complex) and there cannot be an unintelligible proposition (refer back to the verifiability criterion of intelligibility).

v) A statement must be uttered in a language - but in any language. The language employed merely conveys the statement (in communication); it is the proposition conveyed, not the sentence which conveys it, which governs what the statement is.

[Here, think again of the `four terms' of communication]



5. So, let us now turn to language, the mode of communication, and sentences, the (symbol-token) units within the language.

a) In a complex language (like English) the connotation and denotation of terms, along with sequencing and punctuation, are the `rules' which give significance to the symbol-tokens - the sentences. Note again the relationship between the connotation and denotation of terms and the particular and universal functions of the elements (this X is Y) of the proposition (the content of the message - that information about the world which is stated when a statement is made by somebody).

Proposition: this instance of X-ness happens to be an instance of Y-ness. Sentence: This unit of the denotation of `X' (subject) happens to be an instance of the connotation (unit of the denotation) of `Y' (predicate).

[This is what people have referred to when they have spoken of language `mirroring' reality (or thought about it)].

But, as we have seen, it is the sentence which is the symbol-token - the relating of two (or more) terms in a way that represents the relationship between the elements of the proposition (and, thereby, the relationship which pertains in objective reality).

So we might say that a language is `composed of' sentences in the same way as thought is `composed of' propositions and communication is `composed of' statements.

It was pointed out (4 c) above) that statements are the act of communicating; we can now see that sentences are the mode of communicating.

b) But - just as a statement may or may not achieve communinication, so a sentence may or may not convey a statement.

Remember that a sentence is a symbol-token functioning as such according to the rules of the language in question. What makes it a sentence, therefore, is its adherence to those rules, not its actual functioning as a conveyor of an intelligible statement about the world. Thus, whereas:

i) Every statement which is communicated must be conveyed by a sentence - nevertheless

ii) It does not follow that every sentence must convey - or even be capable of conveying - a statement.

Think again of the `sentence form' which `reflects' the `propositional form' (what we call in grammatical studies subject/predicate). `Last Tuesday fell down the stairs' is a perfectly good sentence it has a subject and a predicate which includes a verb. But it conveys no statement - there is no expression here of a `thinkable' - a proposition about the world.

Here two important points should be noted:

i) That a nonsense-sentence of this kind is possible only in a highly complex language - like English. In a very simple language - like race-course tick-tack or international maritime code - it is not possible to `transmit nonsense' since each symbol-token has its fixed significance (the proposition asserted). The only nonsense possible here is the simultaneous display of two contradictory messages - like `I am entering port' and `I am departing from port'.

In effect, this is what a `nonsense sentence' in English is doing. Here refer back to the discussion (3 c) v above) of the `propositional nature' of the particular (the subject) within the proposition. You will then realise that `Last Tuesday fell down the stairs' is in fact asserting:

a. Tuesday was a day last week

b. Some (physical) object fell down the stairs

c. Tuesday was that object.

And it is only because a. and b. are quite simply intelligible to us that we recognise immediately that they are incompatible - that c. is not thinkable.

ii) Thus it is possible for us to say what we cannot think - to `illustrate' the unthinkable. We are not dealing with a `self-contradictory proposition' - there could be no such thing; we are dealing with two propositions, seen intuitively to be incompatible with each other.

So the fact that we can, by the rules, have a nonsense- sentence enables us (in a sophisticated language) to discuss nonsense (absurdity) and contrast it with the intelligible - but it does not imply that there must be `nonsense (absurd) statements'. [Indeed `This is a nonsense statement' is itself a nonsense sentence!]

e) Let us now round things off by considering what can and can't intelligibly be said about sentences -

i) Plainly they are not true or false - the statements they convey can be expressing true or false propositions.

ii) A sentence is an entity (a symbol-token), not a function - though it has a function, to render possible the conveyance of a statement, the communication of a (propositional) message.

iii) As an `entity' it can be elegant or inelegant (the province of literary aesthetics) or effective or ineffective (the province of communication skills). When people say `Let me put that differently' they mean `Let me use a better sentence to convey that same statement'.

iv) Since it is a mode of utterance, a sentence must be a perceptible - but it could be any kind of perceptible. We think of sentences being seen or heard. But they can be felt, as in Braille. Indeed, in principle it would be quite possible to formulate a language of smells or tastes and, if this were done, particular combinations of odours or of savours, would then be sentences within those languages.

v) As seen (in b) above), we can ask intelligibly whether a sentence is intelligible. A statement cannot be made without a sentence being employed, but a sentence can be uttered (and registered as a sentence) without any statement being made. We could, if we wish, say that a nonsense sentence `conveys' a psuedo-statement.



6. So - to summarise:

a) Sentences are the symbol-tokens within languages. As such they can convey statements in communication. Thus they are the modes of stating.

b) Statements are the statings by people that particular states of affairs pertain - i.e. that particular possibilities are actualities. Statements express propositions.

c) Propositions are the `thinkable forms' of states of affairs (of facts). They are, therefore, the `content' of beliefs and are either true or false - dependent upon what is the fact.

d) Facts are those `segments' or `aspects' of fact isolated by the formulation of propositions. Fact is simply the totality of what is so.