2. To assert, however, that Jones knows that the window is open is to make (by implication) an assertion about the state of the window - though not about the causes of Jones's belief. This follows from the fact that knowing is (at least) believing and being right as distinct from believing and being wrong. Our major question for consideration is whether it is also at most believing and being right - i.e. just that.

a) First compare:

i Jones believes the window is open but he is wrong
ii Jones knows the window is open but he is wrong

iii Jones doubts whether the window is open but he is wrong

The first is a perfectly conceivable state of affairs. The second is unthinkable; nobody can know X to be the case if X is not the case.

The third is also unthinkable - but importantly differently; it is not a contradiction but an absurdity. `Jones knows the window is open and he is right' is thinkable, albeit tautological. But `Jones doubts whether the window is open and he is right' is just as silly as `Jones doubts whether the window is open and he is wrong'.

b) So:

i) Jones believing that the window is open can only be a possibility - a conceivable state of affairs which may or may not be so. (Examine Jones to discover whether or not it is so).

ii) The window being open is, similarly a possibility. Examine the window to see whether or not it is so.

iii) But if Jones does believe the window is open and the window is open, then of necessity Jones knows that the window is open. This is what counts as knowing.

c. It should be clear that knowing is not doing anything over and above believing. Believing is the only performance involved. It counts as knowing if and only if it happens to be right.

Here compare racing and winning. Racing is what we do and it counts as winning if we come first. This does not imply that winning just is racing; it is racing and happening to come first. The people who do not win are racing just as much as the winner, and, similarly, people who are making mistakes are believing just as much (and in exactly the same way) as people who are getting it right -i.e. knowing things. Here it is useful to consider the concept of mis-take: taking (believing) one state of affairs to be some different state of affairs.

d. So, to summarise:

If Jones is not certain. (doubts) that the window is open then he cannot be right (know) or be wrong (mistaken) -
If Jones is certain (believes) that the window is open (or that it is not open) then either he knows or he is mistaken. Which of these depends upon whether or not the window happens to be open.

3. Consider the ways in which the term `know' is used. You will find that it is always used dispositionally; compare:

He knows his own name

He knows how to drive a car

He knows that his wife is ill

He knows the Director personally

a) These might appear to be different kinds of knowing and we shall return to this point later. But, for the present, note that none of these assertions is about anything he is doing now. It is not suggested that he is presently contemplating his name, driving a car, thinking about his wife's illness or chatting with the Director - merely that if his attention were drawn to any of these things he would perform appropriately - tell you his name, drive efficiently, expect his wife to behave as an invalid or greet the Director as an acquaintance.

b. The notion of occurrent knowing seems distinctly odd;
`What is he doing at present?' `He is knowing that the window is open'! We feel that there is no conceivable state of affairs that could count as occurrent knowing. Yet, as we have already seen, a dispositional state is intelligible only in terms of occasional occurrences - it would be senseless to assert that Jones can ride a bike if it were never the case that Jones is riding a bike; as it is generally put, there must be some occurrences which actualise the disposition.
[Here note the old joke: `Can you fly an aeroplane?' - `I don't know, I've never tried']

c. There seems, therefore, to be a prima-facie problem that, if there can be no occurrent knowing, then there can be no dispositional knowing either. The problem dissolves, however, as soon as we remember what counts as Jones knowing that the window is open - his believing that it is open when it is open. All that he is doing is believing - and there is no problem about the dispositional belief/occurrent belief relationship. Occurrently believing - e.g. that Julius Caesar landed in Britain in 55 BC - is simply saying 55 BC' when asked; dispositional believing of this is merely being disposed (having the capacity) to say '55 BC' when asked.

Since being certain and being right is knowing, it follows that the only occurrences required to actualise dispositional knowings are occurrent believings (i.e. appropriate behaviour patterns) - provided only that what is believed is in fact so.

To say, therefore, that Jones knows that X is so is simply to say that Jones is dispositionally conditioned to be certain that X is so (i.e. respond confidently to an X situation) whenever appropriate stimuli draw his attention to the question - and that X is in fact the case.

d. At this stage it should be noted, however, that to assert that Jones believes his father is Irish is not merely to make a prediction about what Jones would say if; it is to make an assertion about Jones here and now. If he had once known this but forgotten it, it would not be true that he now knows it. Thus, to say that Jones knows that his father is Irish is to say that Jones's present condition (i.e. the state of his brain) is such that, if he were asked `What nationality is your Father?' he would find himself replying `Irish' - and, further, that Jones's father is indeed Irish. [Here it is useful, and perhaps salutory, to consider what we are asserting about a computer when we assert that it is programmed to perform certain tasks].

4. Essentially we are concerned here with beliefs which are right or wrong. More usually people speak of beliefs as being true or false and, at this stage, it should be profitable to take a first look at the concept of truth.

a. Much nonsense is talked about truth; people speak of grasping it, pursuing it, revering it - as though it were some kind of person. The point is that there just is no `it' in any entity kind of way. There are no TRUTHS waiting around to be grasped. We can pursue robbers, or rabbits, and we know what counts as catching them - but we cannot conceive what it would be like to catch TRUTH.

Persuing truth is the same kind of absurdity (category error) as toasting yesterday for tea. `Truth', like `knowledge', is simply a noun form in our language for the business of things being true (or known). What we are speaking of, in the one case, is the trueness of those propositions which correspond with reality and, in the other case, the knowing that certain situations are the case by people who believe propositions to be true when they are true.

Thus trueness and knowing are closely inter-related. But there are no such objects as TRUTH or KNOWLEDGE. To speak of accumulating knowledge (like accumulating money or tins of sardines) is just as silly, just as vacuous, as to speak of pursuing truth. What would a unit of knowledge be? What is it like when we have it?

All we can say intelligibly is that to know that X is so is to be certain that X is so when X is so - and that a proposition is true when it corresponds with what is the case, and false when it does not.

b) It should now be clear that to believe rightly (i.e. to know something) is simply to accept as true a proposition which is true.

Although we talk of true and false beliefs (and it would be pedantic to object to this habit) it should be realised that, strictly speaking, a belief (i.e. a believing of something by somebody) is not the kind of thing which can be true or false - it is simply a state of certainness about a state of affairs - it is the proposition which is the content of that believing which is either true or false. And we should be quite clear that:

i) the trueness (or falsity) of the proposition depends upon actuality (objective reality) -
ii) believing is simply somebody's (behavioural) assumption that a given proposition is true - i.e. that a given actuality pertains -
iii) knowing is so doing and being right
iv) mistaking is so doing and being wrong-and
v) doubting is simply entertaining a proposition without any such behavioural assumption of its truth or its falsity i.e. displaying a lack of total confidence.

c. It is also important to realise that whatever could be true, could be false. This follows from the fact that a proposition must refer to a possibility. Indeed it is because the proposition (the content of the believing) could, of necessity, be either true or false that, also of necessity, any belief could be wrong.
It also follows that the common expression `necessary truth' is a very foolish category error, an absurdity. If X is necessary it is neither true nor false - it is simply as it has to be. Truth and falsity are of propositions about states of affairs - and no state of affairs could be a necessity.

d. States of affairs (i.e. objective reality) just are what they happen to be . What is the case cannot be dependant upon anybody's belief or even everybody's belief. Think of the flat earth belief in the medieval world. The truth (or falsity) of the belief is dependent upon the state of affairs. If Jones and Brown disagree (believe incompatible things about the state of the world) then at least one of them is wrong (they may both be wrong).

So consider the absurdity of suggestions that something is true for Jones but not for Brown. All that can be said intelligibly is that Jones believes it to be true and Brown believes it to be untrue - and either of them could be wrong. Note also that one of them must be wrong and one of them must be right. We shall return to this point later.

e. Note also that a proposition cannot become true (or false). If it is true, it always was and always will be. Anybody who has problems with this is most likely misunderstanding the nature of propositions. States of affairs do change; yesterday it was raining in Newcastle, today it is fine. Thus yesterday to utter `It is now raining in Newcastle' was to utter a true proposition whereas to utter `It is raining now in Newcastle' today is to utter a false proposition. But they are two different propositions because they are two different nows. If the proposition Rain in Newcastle at 4.OOpm, January 1st, 2000' is true then it always will be true (and, indeed, always was true); we shall return to this point. As we shall see when we consider Identity, any thing has a history of change. Thus, what we regard as `that thing' will be different at different times. But it is that history (of change) which makes that thing the thing that it is for us. And the history does not change - the sequence of change (which is the history of that thing) just is what it is - and always was and always will be.

f. Our beliefs also change. Before the circumnavigation of the globe nearly everyone believed that the world was flat. But it was not flat - they were all mistaken. After the circumnavigation they replaced a false belief with a true one (so we believe). i.e. People had accepted a false proposition as true - and no longer did so.

It should, therefore, be plain that the only circumstances in which Jones can know something at one time and not know the same thing at another time are when Jones believes differently - the object of his belief just is the way it is.

5. What we have, then, is a very simple, straightforward account of the nature of knowing - To know that X is so is to believe (be certain) that X is so when X is so - i.e. to accept the proposition `X is so' as true when it is true. The very simplicity of this account does, however, pose some prima facie problems which should be considered.

a) (refer back 3a) - It is often suggested that there are different kinds of knowing
- knowing it, knowing that..., knowing how to etc. Certainly there are different ways of using the term `know': I know he is a postman but I don't actually know him! If there are different kinds of knowing, can we subsume them all into the same formula?

b) By the formula we have adopted we are obliged to accept as an instance of knowing any lucky guess' - and people may find this hard to accept. For instance, if Jones just believes (he knows not why) that his wife is unfaithful - and she is - then he knows that she is.

c. We have identified knowing, not by example but by formula. Thus, although we know what counts as knowing (a matter of necessity), we have no means of distinguishing specific knowings from specific mistakes. If X is believed and if X is so, then X is known - but it may not be believed and, if it is, then it may not be so.

It seems to follow from this that, although we can and do know things, we can never know which things it is that we know. This has sometimes been referred to as `the problem of knowledge' and needs careful analysis to show that it is not really a problem at all.

First, however, we shall look at the lesser problems in a) and b) above.

6. Do the different usages of `know' reflect different kinds of knowing? Are there relevantly different performances involved in knowing that, knowing it, knowing what and knowing how to? a. Consider `He knows what his name is - Bert'.
Could he know what his name is if he didn't know it were Bert (assuming it is Bert)? Is the information given by this assertion in any way different from that given by

i) He knows that his name is Bert

ii) `He knows how to identify himself by name - as Bert'?

The point is that to know just is to accept a true proposition as true - and a proposition must have propositional form - that X is Y. So that, however it is expressed, what is known is in effect that this person's name is Bert.

b) When we look at knowing how to .... the difference seems greater; we say that Jones knows how to e.g. swim breaststroke when we mean that he can do it - i.e. that he has learned and not forgotten. But what it is he has not forgotten is what he learned - and this can only be a catalogue of`thats' - that the legs frog-kick, that the arms move together, that breath is taken in as the arms move back - etc.

Look at the notion of learning; it is becoming aware of something he was not formerly aware of. Since all thinking is necessarily propositional (a point we shall deal with later at greater length), what is learned and remembered can only be that certain propositions are true, that certain states of affairs do pertain.

It may be objected here that it does make sense to say `I do know how to swim breaststroke but I can't actually do it'. This might be said, for instance, by somebody who suffers from rheumatism, or simply by somebody who has read a manual but never been in the water. But this person really doesn't know how to. He knows some, but only some, of the `catalogue of thats' which amounts to knowing how to swim breaststroke - those `thats' (propositions) which are expressable in language. Any skill requires also those `knowing that-s' which are expressable only in action - i.e. in bodily reaction.

Here it may be objected that such bodily reactions are simply auto-responses, not conscious activities at all (not `accompanied by anything in the mind'). So they are but, as we have already seen, being certain just is responding to the perceived environment; there are no ghostly mental activities forming a connection between the perceived environment and the reaction to it. What we are conscious of is the world out there and our consciousness of it just is our behavioural response to it.

It should, then, be clear that it is not being claimed that knowing how to just is knowing that .... any more than that knowing that just is knowing how to. After all, knowing that Henry VIII had six wives just is being able confidently to say `six' when asked how many wives he had. What is claimed here is that knowing that and knowing how to are one and the same thing. Knowing is believing (and being right); believing is behaving appropriately to the believed situation - i.e. knowing how to behave in that situation.

c. Let's allow that we are not talking of different kinds of knowing, simply of different kinds of things known. Consider, for instance, the question ; `Do you know Beethoven's 6th Symphony?' Addressed to a `listener' this would signify; `Do you know how to (can you) recognise it?' To a musicologist it would signify; `Can you give an accurate analysis of it in symphonic terms?'. To a musician it would signify `Can you play it?' In each case what is needed (for a correct positive answer) is a `catalogue of thats' - but different `catalogues of thats' representing different appropriate behavioural response patterns.

d. Finally look at the alleged difference between knowing that .... and `knowing by acquaintance' (I know that George is the manager, but I don't know him). But what could count as knowing him other than knowing that he is six foot tall, good looking, a bank manager, well-spoken with a lisp, kind to his dog etc.
How we came to know these things is plainly irrelevant.

`I know Jones but I know absolutely nothing about him' might be said - but as soon as we think about it we realise that it is a patently ridiculous assertion. [Here perhaps we should note that there is one important distinction, which we shall deal with when we examine perception, between knowing that and knowing how. But this is not how to; it is how an appearance presents, how things look, smell, sound etc., as distinct from what they are (or are taken to be). Because the awareness of these `hows' is essential to any knowing at all, there is a sense in which all knowing involves acquaintance - but it will be seen in due course that this does not create a different kind of knowing, merely the distinction of essential elements in the process of gaining awareness of the world about us].

e) Let us, then, allow that the problem of different kinds of knowing does not exist. The differences are merely in the appropriate ways of speaking of different situations. Very generally we tend to use `knowing that' language when the knowing manifests in utterances, `knowing how to' language when it manifests in other behavioural ways (which we think of as skills) and `knowing it' (or him) when we have gained the knowledge by direct acquaintance with appearances presented by what we regard as it (or him).

7. Now turn to the `lucky guess problem'. The discomfort people feel here arises from three (quite wrong) assumptions:
that we can know the past but not the future -
that we can `really know' only what has been proved - and-
that whether we know is in some way dependant upon why we believe.

It can be demonstrated fairly simply that these are all wrong assumptions.

a. Consider a horse-race punter who is quite certain that Blue Peter will win the 2.30 the following day. And let's allow that it is the case that Blue Peter will win the 2.30 the following day. Under these conditions we cannot deny that he knows that Blue Peter will win. People are inclined to say `Well, he was right but he couldn't have known' but being right is knowing, there's no could or couldn't have about it!

b. The fact that it `hasn't happened yet' is quite irrelevant. If we can say after the event `He knew it would win', then we can say before the event `He knows it will win' - remember that what is the case always was and always will be the case - the history of events is just what it is. Here compare the situation where somebody is watching an aeroplane fly overhead and sees a wheel come adrift and start falling. That man's certainness (belief) that the wheel will hit the ground will be manifested in his running for cover. And, since it indeed will hit the ground, he knows that it will hit the ground. As has already been seen, and will be seen many times more, most of our believings (and thereby our knowings) are predictions.

c. Yet some people will still claim that there is a relevant difference between the two cases - because (they will say) it has been proved that objects dropped from the sky hit the ground but not that fancied horses win races.

But this shows a confusion between proving by logical demonstration of necessity - as with syllogistic reasoning or geometrical theorems - and `proving' by empirical demonstration that certain things will happen in certain conditions.

Here the analysis of possibility and necessity must be taken wholly seriously; since we are dealing with possibilities (thinkables),then, of necessity, nothing can render their being so, or not being so, necessary. No demonstration of matters of fact, therefore (no quantity of accumulated evidence), can ever establish that a state of affairs must be so; at most it can convince particular individuals that it is or will be so - and, however convinced they are, they could be wrong. From which it follows that what people call `proving' that some state of affairs is so can only be persuading somebody (themselves or somebody else) that it is so. And whether or not anyone is persuaded is simply whether or not he finds himself certain that it is so.

And, of course, if Jones is certain that Blue Peter will win tomorrow, then he has been persuaded that this is so, whether we would have been or not.

d. This is one of those situations, not uncommon in philosophy, where people cannot refute the argument but they don't like the conclusion - so they tend to wriggle. They say things like `Yes, knowing is correct belief - but it is only justified correct belief'. But they never explain by whom, to whom or how it is `justified'. The suggestion is that a believing, even if it happens to be right, can count as a knowing only if there were `good grounds' for the believing in question. But:

i) `good' is intelligible only as good for some person for some purpose (this will be examined at length later) and in this case, the person must be the believer and the purpose can only be `getting it right'. So, if he does get it right, the grounds, whatever they were, were good ones.
ii) as juries well know, nothing could ever count as all the evidence relevant to a given question. Each of us seeks sufficient evidence to convince him - to suggest that this might not be adequate evidence is to misunderstand the concept of adequateness. If somebody asserted `X is adequate' he would promptly be asked `For what?' Thus, adequate evidence is intelligible only as evidence adequate to render that person certain that that state of affairs pertains. As he is certain about it, the evidence plainly was adequate. We can ask `Is the water supply adequate to run the washing machine?' when we are inspecting the house, but we cannot sensibly ask this question when it is running the washing machine quite satisfactorily.

e. The problem many people have over this point arises from their inability to take seriously their own acceptance that -

i) matters of fact can never be necessities

ii) knowing is not an additional activity to believing; believing is being certain and it is not possible to be more certain than certain
iii) no amount of being certain can make it so.

The resolution of the lucky guess problem (if it be a problem) lies, not in the invention of quite untenable extra conditions for knowing, but in the realisation that believing is being certain - i.e. having no doubt - and that people practically never are certain without what most other people would accept as good grounds. Experience shows us that experience governs our beliefs. Look again at our punter. He may say `I'm certain Blue Peter will win tomorrow' but what would count as his being certain? Nothing short of drawing out his entire savings from his bank, mortgaging his house, borrowing all he could (and probably embezzling his firms money too) and plonking the whole lot on Blue Peter.

That he does not do so is indication enough that, whatever he says, he is not certain - i.e. he doubts. And, as we have seen, a doubter can neither know nor be mistaken.

8. We come now to the third problem (5c above) and this is not so easily resolved. It is possible, however, to clear away some common confusions and to show that the disquiet which leads people to see it as the problem of knowledge arises largely from the misconceptions that knowledge is some kind of entity and knowing is some kind of special activity.

a) As established:

i) A belief is somebody's belief that a state of affairs is so (that a possibility is an actuality).
ii) It follows, therefore, that any belief could be wrong.
iii) A knowing is somebody's belief which is not wrong - i.e. a belief that X is so when X is so.

Now compare -

i) A pen is an instrument for writing, i.e. making an ink-line on a surface.
ii) It may contact the paper with a point, a nib, a piece of fabric or a ball-bearing.
iii) A ballpoint pen is a pen which contacts by ball-bearing.

In both cases we are stipulating what counts as (in one case knowing - in the other a ballpoint pen).

So to determine whether this is a ballpoint pen I check:

i) that it is an instrument for writing (yes it is)
ii) that it operates by ball-bearing (yes it does) -

So I have observed by these two separate observations that it is (what counts as) a ballpoint pen.

Similarly, if I want to check the assertion `Jones knows the window is open', I must make two observations (since two things are implied) -

i) that Jones is certain that the window is open - I do this by examining Jones, his actions and utterances - and
ii) that the window is open - I do this by examining the window.

But -

i) all I can have is my own beliefs - about Jones's certainness and about the openness of the window - and these, like any beliefs, could be wrong.
ii) Jones himself cannot observe the state of the window (as a check on his belief) in any way other than he has already done in formulating that belief.

Put very simply: To specify the nature of knowing we are obliged to distinguish between what is believed to be the case and what is the case - but our only experiential criterion of what is the case is what we believe to be the case. We have no special and different access to objective reality; any belief could be wrong and the only check upon it is by another belief

- which equally could be wrong.

b. If we look at this problem in terms of truth (to know is to accept as true a proposition which is true) -

i) Our criterion of truth is correspondence between the proposition and the state of affairs (objective reality)
ii) But - our identification of true propositions can only be their coherence (compatibility) with all other propositions which we believe to be true.

There is a sense, therefore, in which objective reality is merely postulated, not experienced as such. And from this it follows that knowing and trueness are `merely postulated'. Yet they must be postulated for there to be belief at all (Consider this carefully). We see that objective reality (fact), truth and knowing are all inter-dependent concepts - intelligible in terms of each other - but (necessarily) not verifiable by any ultimate testing process.

c. It follows, nevertheless, that people must know things.

i) Consider a situation where two people disagree; Brown believes the paper is white, Jones believes it is green. At least one of them is wrong. They may both be wrong - it may be pink. But let us say that Brown believes it is white and Jones disbelieves this (believes it is not white). Here we have genuine contradiction - so one of them must be right. So, either it is the case that Brown knows the paper is white or it is the case that Jones knows the paper is not white.
ii) Now allow that the paper is pink and that Jones believes it is green and Brown believes it is white. Thus Jones says `No, it is not white' and Brown says `No, it is not green'. Although they are both wrong in their more precise beliefs (that it is white or is green), they are both right in their less precise beliefs (that it is not white and not green).

It is important to realise that beliefs are not discrete, one-at-a-time things; believing is our responses to our total environments. When anyone asserts a belief, he is in effect asserting everything (at a lower level of precision) implied by that belief. To say, `This is a 1985 Holden car is to say `This is a Holden' , `This is a car' , `This is a vehicle' , `This is a manufactured article' , `This is a physical object'. And at some level he is bound to be right. The point is that error can occur only within a framework of correct judgement (knowing). We should not ask simply `Is that a mistake?` but `At what level of precision did the mistake occur?' We cannot mistake a gum tree for a wattle tree without knowing that it is a tree.

d) But - though people must know things, can they know which things they know? Either Brown knows that the paper is white or Jones knows that the paper is not white - but nothing could determine irrevocably which of them is the knower and which the mistaker.

This has led to the suggestion that, although Jones can, indeed must, know things, he can never know that he knows them. This, however, is an error - arising from a slide-back to regarding knowing as a special kind of activity. Let's allow that:

i Jones believes the window is open
ii The window is open

It follows that Jones knows that the window is open. Jones now turns his attention from the window to his own awareness - so

i) Jones believes that -Jones knows that the window is open

ii) (see above) Jones does know that the window is open

It, therefore, follows that Jones knows that Jones knows that the window is open.

e. This demonstrates quite clearly that, if we know something, then we can know that we know it. But there is no way of getting rid of that `if' . The window might not be open (we may all be mistaken about it), in which case Jones does not know and cannot, therefore, know that he knows.

Here we strike the real problem; it is not that we cannot know that we know something, it is that we cannot, by any irrevocable test, determine which things we know.

Let's, for the sake of the argument, think simplistically of neat, discrete beliefs and say that Jones has 100 such beliefs and `scores' (gets it right) 99% of the time. So the chances are that, looking at his battery of beliefs we can say that 99 of these are knowings. But, when we look at these one at a time, we have to allow in each individual case that this could be the mistake. As pointed out earlier, if getting it wrong felt different from getting it right we could never get it wrong.

f. Thus there can be no guarantee that any specific belief, however widely accepted and however `supported' by other specific beliefs, is not wrong. But this is not a problem. Look at the notion of guarantee: the guarantee you get with your new iron does not establish that it cannot break down; it merely promises that, if it does, it will be replaced. Similarly, if any belief becomes incompatible with other beliefs then we simply find ourselves no longer believing some things which we formerly believed.

Properly understood, the distinction we make between believing and knowing just is our acceptance of an objective reality independent of ourselves. To believe is to believe that we know. Without the postulation of objective reality (and, thereby, of knowing and truth) there could be no coherent thought at all.